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1 Introduction
Many important solution concepts for transferable-utility n-person coalitional
games can be equivalently expressed as formulas involving gradients or gen-
eralized gradients of a suitable extension of the given game. This applies to
some of the well-known single-valued solutions, such as the Shapley value and
the Banzhaf–Coleman index of power. These constructions usually rely on the
multilinear extension of coalitional games as functions from the discrete cube
{0, 1}n onto [0, 1]n; see [14, Chapter XII], for example. The purpose of such
a “differential representation” of the solution is not only computational, but
it is also to provide a new interpretation of the corresponding payoff vectors,
which usually revolves around the idea of marginal contributions to a given
coalition.
The recent progress in variational analysis [13,17] enables us to construct
various kinds of generalized derivatives, the so-called subgradients and super-
gradients, for a very large family of lower semicontinuous functions. The con-
cept of a gradient of a differentiable function is replaced by that of a sub-
differential (superdifferential) of a possibly nonsmooth function. The elements
of a superdifferential—the supergradients—have a close geometric connection
with Jacobians of all smooth majorants of the function at the neighborhood
of a given point; see Appendix A. The Fre´chet superdifferential, the limiting
(Mordukhovich) superdifferential and the Clarke superdifferential count among
the main superdifferentials used in nonsmooth analysis.
The representation of some solution concepts by generalized derivatives for
selected classes of cooperative games was studied already by Aubin [2]. The
authors of [5,18] use the Lova´sz extension of a coalitional game in order to
express the core and the Weber set in terms of its Fre´chet and the Clarke
superdifferential, respectively.
In this paper we pursue a converse research direction by adopting the idea
proposed in [18]: We employ the limiting superdifferential to define a new solu-
tion concept for coalitional games, the so-called intermediate set. Specifically,
the intermediate set is the limiting superdifferential of the Lova´sz extension
for the grand coalition. The associated payoff vectors can be thus interpreted
as marginal contributions to the grand coalition. However, several questions
arise at this point, for instance:
– What is an interpretation and properties of the intermediate set?
– Are the payoff vectors in the intermediate set determined by some reason-
able principles of profit allocation?
The main goal of this paper is to argue that the newly constructed so-
lution is sensible and interesting from many perspectives. Using the tools of
variational analysis, we will show that the intermediate set
– is a nonempty, subadditive and Pareto optimal solution,
– is a finite union of (possibly empty) convex polytopes, each of which can
be interpreted as a core of some “marginal” game,
– lies in-between the core and the Weber set,
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– coincides with the core if and only if the game is supermodular.
The intermediate set can be viewed as a nonempty interpolant between the
core and the Weber set, which is convenient especially whenever the former is
very small and the latter is huge. Our Theorem 1 provides a clear interpretation
of the payoff vectors from the intermediate set: for some coalitional chain, each
such vector is a Weber-style marginal vector on the level of blocks of coalitions
and, at the same time, no coalition inside each block can improve upon this
payoff vector in the sense of marginal coalitional contributions. Hence, the
intermediate set is a solution concept that looks globally like the Weber set,
but behaves locally like the core concept. In Theorem 2 we will show that
the intermediate set is a non-convex polyhedron whose convex components
coincide with cores of some games, which are determined by a given coalitional
chain and marginal coalitional contributions. As for examples, the intermediate
set on the class of simple games and glove games is computed in Theorem 3
and Theorem 4, respectively.
The article is structured as follows. We fix our notation and terminology in
Section 2, where we repeat basic facts about solution concepts, the Lova´sz ex-
tension and its superdifferentials. Section 3 contains a characterization of the
intermediate set based on coalitional chains in the player set (Theorem 1) and
discussion of a distribution process that leads to a payoff vector in the interme-
diate set. Some motivating examples are also included (Examples 1 and 3). We
carry out an in-depth inspection of the properties of the intermediate set and
compare it to the various solution concepts in Section 4. Differences among the
core, the intermediate set and the Weber set are summarized in Table 1. Two
selected classes of coalitional games (the simple games and the glove game)
are analyzed in Section 5 in order to refine a formula from Theorem 1. The
main part of the paper is concluded with an outlook towards further research
in Section 6. Appendix consists of two parts. A brief explanation of the notions
from nonsmooth analysis is in Appendix A, with no attempt at a comprehen-
sive discussion of all the results needed in the paper. Appendix B contains the
proof of our main result, Theorem 1.
2 Core and Weber Set
We use the standard notions and results from cooperative game theory; see
[15]. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players, where n is a positive integer.
A coalition is a subset A ⊆ N and by 2N we denote the powerset of N .
A coalitional game (with transferable utility) is a function v : 2N → R with
v(∅) = 0. Any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn is called a payoff vector. We introduce
the following notation:
x(A) =
∑
i∈A
xi, for every A ⊆ N .
We say that a payoff vector x is feasible in a game v whenever x(N) ≤ v(N).
The set of all feasible payoff vectors in v is denoted by F(v).
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Let Γ (N) be the set of all games and Ω ⊆ Γ (N). A solution on Ω is a set-
valued mapping σ : Ω → 2R
n
that sends every game v ∈ Ω to a set σ(v) ⊆ F(v).
We recall the core solution and the Weber set. The core of a game v is the
convex polytope
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), x(A) ≥ v(A) for every A ⊆ N}.
The core is always contained in the set I(v) of all imputations in the game v,
I(v) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ v({i}), i ∈ N}. (1)
Let Πn be the set of all the permutations π of the player set N . Let
v ∈ Γ (N) and π ∈ Πn. A marginal vector of a game v with respect to π is the
payoff vector xv(π) ∈ Rn with coordinates
xvi (π) = v

 ⋃
j≤π−1(i)
{π(j)}

− v

 ⋃
j<π−1(i)
{π(j)}

 , i ∈ N. (2)
The Weber set of v is the convex hull of all the marginal vectors of v,
W(v) = conv{xv(π) | π ∈ Πn}.
Since xv(π)(N) = v(N), the Weber set is a solution on Γ (N). Moreover, the
inclusion C(v) ⊆ W(v) holds true for every v ∈ Γ (N); see [25, Theorem 14].
The fundamental tool in this paper is the concept of Lova´sz extension [12].
For every set A ⊆ N let χA denote the incidence vector in R
n whose coordi-
nates are given by
(χA)i =
{
1 if i ∈ A,
0 otherwise.
(3)
We write 0 in place of χ∅. The embedding of 2
N into Rn by means of the
mapping A 7→ χA makes it possible to interpret a game on 2N as a real
function on {0, 1}n. Indeed, it is enough to define vˆ(χA) = v(A) for every
A ⊆ N . The function vˆ can be extended onto the whole of Rn as follows. For
every x ∈ Rn, put
Π(x) = {π ∈ Πn | xπ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ xπ(n)}.
Given i ∈ N and π ∈ Π(x), define
V πi (x) = {j ∈ N | xj ≥ xπ(i)}.
Note that V πi (x) = V
ρ
i (x) for every π, ρ ∈ Π(x). This implies that any vector
x ∈ Rn can be unambiguously written as a linear combination
x =
n−1∑
i=1
(xπ(i) − xπ(i+1)) · χV pi
i
(x) + xπ(n) · χN (4)
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for an arbitrary π ∈ Π(x). It is convenient to define V π0 (x) := ∅. Then we can
rewrite (4) as
x =
n∑
i=1
xπ(i) ·
(
χV pi
i
(x) − χV pi
i−1
(x)
)
. (5)
The Lova´sz extension vˆ of v ∈ Γ (N) is the function Rn → R defined linearly
with respect to the decomposition (5):
vˆ(x) =
n∑
i=1
xπ(i) ·
(
v(V πi (x)) − v(V
π
i−1(x))
)
, for any x ∈ Rn. (6)
Observe that the definition of vˆ(x) is independent on the choice of π ∈ Π(x).
Clearly vˆ(χA) = v(A) for every coalition A ⊆ N . It is easy to see that the
Lova´sz extension vˆ of any game v fulfills these properties:
– vˆ is continuous and piecewise affine on Rn;
– vˆ is positively homogeneous: vˆ(λ ·x) = λ · vˆ(x) for every λ ≥ 0 and x ∈ Rn;
– the mapping v ∈ Γ (N) 7→ vˆ is linear.
The following easy lemma says that the local behavior of vˆ is the same around
χN as in the neighborhood of 0.
Lemma 1 For any x ∈ Rn it holds true that
vˆ(x+ χN ) = vˆ(x) + vˆ(χN ).
Proof This follows directly from the definition (6) together with the identities
Π(x + χN ) = Π(x), Π(χN ) = Πn, and V
π
1 (χN ) = . . . = V
π
n (χN ) = N for
every π ∈ Πn. ⊓⊔
A game v ∈ Γ (N) is called supermodular (or convex ) if the following
inequality is satisfied:
v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B), for every A,B ⊆ N .
Every supermodular game v is also superadditive:
v(A ∪B) ≥ v(A) + v(B), for every A,B ⊆ N with A ∩B = ∅.
A game v is submodular if the game −v is supermodular. A game v is called
additive when v(A ∪ B) = v(A) + v(B) for every A,B ⊆ N with A ∩ B = ∅.
We will make an ample use of several characterizations of supermodular games
appearing in the literature.
Proposition 1 Let v ∈ Γ (N). Then the following are equivalent:
1. v is supermodular;
2. {xv(π) | π ∈ Πn} ⊆ C(v);
3. C(v) =W(v);
4. The Lova´sz extension vˆ of v is a concave function.
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Proof Shapley [20] proved 1.⇒ 2. and Weber [25] showed that 2.⇒ 3., respec-
tively. The implication 3. ⇒ 1. was shown by Ichiishi [10]. The equivalence
between 1. and 4. is the “supermodular” version of the theorem originally
proved by Lova´sz in [12] for submodular games. ⊓⊔
Remark 1 An extensive survey of the conditions equivalent to supermodularity
together with (references to) the proofs can be found in [22, Appendix A]. The
notion of “convexity” is somewhat overloaded in the game-theoretic literature
since it appears in a number of different contexts and meanings. On top of that
convex games have concave Lova´sz extensions. For those reasons we strictly
prefer the term “supermodular game” over “convex game”, although the latter
is commonly used. △
The Lova´sz extension vˆ of a coalitional game v is used to characterize the
core and the Weber set by the tools of nonsmooth calculus. It was shown in
[5, Proposition 3] that the core coincides with the Fre´chet superdifferential of
vˆ at 0, C(v) = ∂ˆvˆ(0). Similarly, from [18, Proposition 4.1] we know that the
Weber set is the Clarke superdifferential of vˆ at 0, W(v) = ∂vˆ(0). From the
viewpoint of game theory, however, it is more sensible to evaluate the superdif-
ferentials of vˆ at χN since it conforms with the idea of marginal contributions
to the grand coalition N . This is possible by Lemma 1 so that we can shift
the computations of the respective superdifferentials to χN .
Proposition 2 For every game v ∈ Γ (N),
C(v) = ∂ˆvˆ(χN ) = ∂ˆvˆ(0),
W(v) = ∂vˆ(χN ) = ∂vˆ(0).
3 Intermediate Set
This section is composed of three subsections. In the first one we define the in-
termediate set using the limiting superdifferential. The characterization based
on coalitional chains is proved in Subsection 3.2. In the last subsection we
show that the intermediate set can be expressed as a union of cores of certain
marginal games.
3.1 Definition and basic properties
As we already noted in the introduction, it can frequently happen that the
core is small or empty and, at the same time, the Weber set is too coarse.
For this reason we follow the idea of Boris Mordukhovich, which was men-
tioned in [18], and we define a new solution concept directly as ∂vˆ(χN ) by
analogy with Proposition 2, where ∂ is the limiting superdifferential. The lim-
iting superdifferential always lies in-between the Clarke superdifferential and
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the Fre´chet superdifferential (see Appendix A). A straightforward interpreta-
tion of the limiting superdifferential is that it coincides with the union of all
Fre´chet superdifferentials with respect to some sufficiently small neighborhood
of the point in question.
Definition 1 Let v ∈ Γ (N). The intermediate set M(v) of v is the set
M(v) := ∂vˆ(χN ).
In Subsection 3.2 we will derive a combinatorial formula for M(v), which
bypasses the computation of Lova´sz extension and the limiting superdifferen-
tial. The following example shows the shape of M(v) for a particular non-
supermodular 3-player game v.
Example 1 Consider a game with the player set N = {1, 2, 3} in which the
first player owns a single left glove, while the remaining two players possess
one right glove each. The profit of a coalition A ⊆ N is the number of glove
pairs the coalition owns:
v(A) =
{
1 if A ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, N},
0 otherwise.
It is not difficult to compute C(v),M(v) and W(v) directly by the definition.
However, since v is both a simple game and a glove game, we can also employ
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 to recoverM(v). Thus,
C(v) = {(1, 0, 0)},
M(v) = conv{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)} ∪ conv{(1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)},
W(v) = conv{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}.
We will briefly comment on the shape of the solutions. The only payoff vector
in the core C(v) assigns the total worth to player 1. This allocation reflects
the principle of stability: the surplus of right-hand gloves on the market makes
both player 2 and 3 accept arbitrarily small payoff. On the other hand, the
Weber set W(v) coincides with the set of all imputations I(v), which may
be difficult to interpret. The intermediate set M(v) allows for two scenaria,
each of which involves two players only: player 1 strikes a deal either with
player 2 or with player 3. Once such a two-player coalition {1, i} arises, where
i ∈ {2, 3}, the coalition has the effective power to distribute its profit to 1 and
i in an arbitrary ratio. The remaining player (a non-contractor) is therefore
eliminated from any allocation process. △
In the rest of this section, we will show basic properties of M(v).
Lemma 2 Let v ∈ Γ (N). Then:
1. M(v) 6= ∅.
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x2
x1
x3
Intermediate set
x2
x1
x3
Weber set
Fig. 1: The intermediate set and the Weber set for the 3-person glove game
2. We have
C(v) ⊆M(v) ⊆ W(v), (7)
where both inclusions may be strict.
3. W(v) = convM(v).
4. v is supermodular if and only if C(v) =M(v).
Proof By [17, Corollary 8.10, Theorem 9.13] we have M(v) 6= ∅. The inclu-
sions (7) follow from the relation ∂ˆf(x) ⊆ ∂f(x) ⊆ ∂f(x); see Appendix A.
Item 3. is a consequence of [17, Theorem 8.49]. Supermodularity of v is equiva-
lent to C(v) =W(v) by Shapley–Ichiishi theorem [20,10]. Thus, item 4. follows
from 3. together with convexity of C(v). ⊓⊔
Analogously to Proposition 2 we can evaluate the limiting superdifferential
at 0 and still obtain the same result, M(v).
Lemma 3 The following identity is satisfied for every game v ∈ Γ (N):
M(v) = ∂vˆ(χN ) = ∂vˆ(0).
Proof By Lemma 1 the Lova´sz extension vˆ has the same structure in the
neighborhood of χN and in the neighborhood of 0. ⊓⊔
Putting together Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, we can now summarize the
relations between the discussed solutions and the superdifferentials as follows:
C(v) = ∂ˆvˆ(χN ) = ∂ˆvˆ(0),
M(v) = ∂vˆ(χN ) = ∂vˆ(0),
W(v) = ∂vˆ(χN ) = ∂vˆ(0).
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3.2 Characterization by chains
In this section we are going to prove the main characterization of the inter-
mediate set, Theorem 1. Its purpose is twofold. First, this result shows that
the purely analytic definition of intermediate set can be equivalently stated
in terms of the combinatorial and order-theoretic properties of a coalitional
game. Second, it may be better to use Theorem 1 than the definition based on
the limiting superdifferential for the computational reasons. In what follows
the main tool is the notion of a coalitional chain, which can be thought of as
a generalization of a permutation (or a total order) on the player set N .
A (coalitional) chain is a subset H = {C1, . . . , Ck} of 2N , such that k ≥ 1,
C1 6= ∅, Ci ( Ci+1 for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, and Ck = N . We will assume C0 := ∅
throughout the paper. Let C be the set of all coalitional chains in 2N . The
family C is associated with the following scheme of allocating payoffs x ∈ Rn
among the players in a game v:
1. The players are organized into a chain H = {C1, . . . , Ck}, depending on
their position in the allocation process.
2. Each coalition Ci \ Ci−1 can distribute the total amount
x(Ci \ Ci−1) = v(Ci)− v(Ci−1) (8)
to its members, for all i = 1, . . . , k. This can be interpreted as the marginal
contribution of Ci \ Ci−1 to the coalition Ci−1 with respect to the chain
H.
3. No coalition B ⊆ Ci \Ci−1 can improve upon x while respecting the order
of coalitions given by H, that is,
x(B) ≥ v(Ci−1 ∪B)− v(Ci−1) (9)
for all B ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1 and all i = 1, . . . , k.
Note that the players share the total of v(N) among them as a consequence
of item 2. Our main result says that x ∈ M(v) if and only if there exists
a chain H such that the total profit v(N) is distributed among the players
according to items 1.–3. above. For any chain H = (C1, . . . , Ck), put
MH(v) = {x ∈ R
n | x satisfies (8) and (9)}.
Theorem 1 Let v ∈ Γ (N). Then
M(v) =
⋃
H∈C
MH(v). (10)
Proof See Appendix B. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1 can serve as an alternative definition of M(v). Since the union
in (10) runs over C , computing M(v) can be a fairly complex task—it is
known that the cardinality of C equals the n-th ordered Bell number. For
example, |C | = 75 for n = 4.
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Remark 2 In order to simplify the notation for coalitions we will occasionally
omit the braces and commas, so that a coalition {i, j} is written as ij. △
The distribution procedure satisfying the conditions 1.–3. above has two
extreme cases. Assume that the chain H is maximal, that is, for some permu-
tation π ∈ Πn we have H = {π(1), π(1)π(2), . . . , π(1) . . . π(n)} . In this case
the profit allocation in any game v leads to a single marginal vector xv(π)
defined by (2), MH(v) = {xv(π)}. On the contrary, if the chain is {N}, then
all the players (and coalitions) are treated equally, which results in distribut-
ing payoffs according to the definition of core, M{N}(v) = C(v). Any chain
H = {C1, . . . , Ck} different from those two borderline cases generates alloca-
tions x ∈ MH(v) combining the rule of marginal contributions for coalitions
Ci \Ci−1 (item 2.) with the core-like stability for sub-coalitions B of Ci \Ci−1
(item 3.).
We will now present two examples. First, we will make use of Theorem 1
to write the formula for the intermediate set of any 3-player coalitional game.
Second, using the first example we will present a game for which the three
considered solution concepts differ substantially.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. The family C of all chains has 13 elements in
this case:
C =
{
{N}, {1, N}, {2, N}, {3, N}, {12, N}, {13,N}, {23, N}
}
∪{
{π(1), π(1)π(2), N} | π ∈ Πn
}
.
Let v ∈ Γ (N). For example, the choice H = {1, N} gives
MH(v) =
{
x ∈ R3 |x1 = v(1), x(23) = v(N)− v(1),
x2 ≥ v(12)− v(1), x3 ≥ v(13)− v(1)
}
.
Theorem 1 says that
M(v) = C(v) ∪
M{1,N}(v) ∪M{2,N}(v) ∪M{3,N}(v) ∪
M{12,N}(v) ∪M{13,N}(v) ∪M{23,N}(v) ∪
{xv(π) | π ∈ Πn}.
△
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and
v(A) =


0 if |A| = 1,
2 if |A| = 2,
3 if A = N.
It is easy to see that v is superadditive but not supermodular. The core of this
game is single-valued, C(v) = {(1, 1, 1)}, whereas the Weber set W(v) is the
hexagon whose 6 vertices are all the coordinate-wise permutations of the payoff
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(a) Core (b) Intermediate set (c) Weber set
Fig. 2: The solutions from Example 3 in the barycentric coordinates
vector (0, 1, 2). The intermediate set is the union of three line segments—see
Figure 2(b). We obtain that M{i,N}(v) = ∅ for every chain {i, N}. On the
other hand, any component M{ij,ijk}(v) is the line segment whose endpoints
are the two marginal vectors x with xk = 1. Thus a payoff vector x ∈ R3 is
in M(v) iff it belongs to M{ij,ijk}(v) for some chain {ij, ijk}. Note that this
example also shows that, in general, the intermediate set is not a union of
some faces of the Weber set. △
Lemma 2 states that v is supermodular if and only if the core coincides with
the intermediate set. We can calculate the form of the intermediate set also
when the game satisfies the converse condition, that is, when v is submodular.
Lemma 4 If v is submodular, then M(v) = {xv(π) | π ∈ Πn}.
Proof Let v be a submodular game. By Theorem 1 we need to prove that
any nonempty MH(v) contains a unique allocation, which is necessarily some
marginal vector. Let H = (C1, . . . , Ck) be a chain and x ∈ MH(v). Take any
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and a coalition A ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1. We obtain
v(Ci)− v(Ci−1)
(8)
= x(Ci \ Ci−1) = x((Ci \ Ci−1) \A) + x(A)
(9)
≥ v(Ci−1 ∪ ((Ci \ Ci−1) \A)) + v(Ci−1 ∪ A)− 2 · v(Ci−1)
≥ v(Ci)− v(Ci−1),
where the last inequality follows from submodularity of v. This yields
x(A) = v(Ci−1 ∪A)− v(Ci−1). (11)
Let j ∈ Ci \ Ci−1 and let B ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1 be such that j /∈ B. It follows from
the identity xj = x(B ∪ {j})− x(B) and from (11) that
xj = v(Ci−1 ∪B ∪ {j})− v(Ci−1 ∪B).
Since the above equality holds true for all i, j and B as specified above, this
immediately implies that x is a marginal vector. ⊓⊔
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Remark 3 (Permission structures) Any coalitional chainH enriches the player
setN with an additional structure. Specifically we will briefly mention that this
is a special case of a permission structure; see [7,8] for details. A permission
structure on N is a mapping S : N → 2N satisfying the following condition:
j ∈ S(i) implies that i /∈ S(j), for each i, j ∈ N . The players in S(i) are said
to be the successors of i ∈ N . A game with permission structure is a triple
(N, v, S), where N is a player set, v is a game and S is a permission structure.
A permission structure is acyclic (or strict) if there is no sequence of players
i1, . . . , im ∈ N such that i1 = im and ik+1 ∈ S(ik) for every k = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Every coalitional chain H = {C1, . . . , Ck} gives rise to an acyclic permission
structure on N . Indeed, it suffices to define a mapping SH : N → 2N by
SH(i) =
{
Cℓ(i)+1 \Cℓ(i) ℓ(i) < k,
∅ ℓ(i) = k.
where ℓ(i) is the smallest integer j such that i ∈ Cj . Then SH is an acyclic
permission structure.
Whereas a permission structure S in (N, v, S) is usually determined by
an a priori known hierarchy among players, we make no such assumption in
this paper. By contrast the computation of intermediate set according to (10)
is based on all the hierarchies among players that are expressible by coalitional
chains H. Thus, there is no preferred coalitional chain H, albeit only the ones
with MH(v) 6= ∅ matter. The latter condition makes it possible to claim that,
in a sense, any game generates a family of permission structures SH satisfying
MH(v) 6= ∅. △
3.3 Characterization by marginal games
We will now show that the intermediate set of any game v can be realized as
a finite union of cores of certain games associated with v and chains H.
Definition 2 Let v ∈ Γ (N) and let H = {C1, . . . , Ck} be a coalitional chain.
For each i = 1, . . . , k we define a game vHi with the player set Ci \ Ci−1:
vHi (B) := v(Ci−1 ∪B)− v(Ci−1), for all B ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1.
An H-marginal game is the game vH with the player set N , where
vH(B) :=
k∑
i=1
vHi (B ∩ (Ci \ Ci−1)), for each B ⊆ N .
Thus, given a game v and a chain H, the H-marginal game vH measures
aggregated marginal coalitional contributions to all the blocks Ci \ Ci−1.
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Remark 4 In order to define the solution concept called equal split-off set,
Branzei et al. introduced in [4, Section 4.2.1] the following notion of marginal
game based on a game v and an ordered partition. We will reformulate it
equivalently using a chain H = {C1, . . . , Ck}. Define a game v¯Hi with the
player set N \ Ci−1 by v¯Hi (B) := v(Ci−1 ∪ B) − v(Ci−1), for all i = 1, . . . , k
and each B ⊆ N \ Ci−1. It is obvious that this definition of marginal game is
different from vHi given above. △
The following lemma says that every component MH(v) of the intermediate
set is the core of an H-marginal game.
Lemma 5 MH(v) = C(vH), for any coalitional chain H = {C1, . . . , Ck}.
Proof According to the definition of vH, we have
vH(B) =
k∑
i=1
vHi (B∩(Ci\Ci−1)) =
k∑
i=1
[v(Ci−1 ∪ (B ∩ (Ci \ Ci−1))) − v(Ci−1)]
(12)
for any B ⊆ N . Let x ∈ C(vH) be arbitrary and consider any i = 1, . . . , k and
any B ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1. Then from the definition of core and (12) we obtain
x(B) ≥ vH(B) = v(Ci−1 ∪B)− v(Ci−1). (13)
By taking B = Ci \ Ci−1,
x(Ci \ Ci−1) ≥ v(Ci)− v(Ci−1). (14)
Plugging B = N into (12) and once more using the definition of core yield
x(N) = vH(N) =
k∑
i=1
[v(Ci)− v(Ci−1)] ,
which implies together with (14),
x(Ci \ Ci−1) = v(Ci)− v(Ci−1).
But the last equality and (13) means that x ∈ MH(v).
Conversely, assume x ∈ MH(v) and fix any B ⊆ N . Then
x(B) =
k∑
i=1
x(B ∩ (Ci \ Ci−1)) ≥
k∑
i=1
[v(Ci−1 ∪ (B ∩ (Ci \ Ci−1))) − v(Ci−1)] = v
H(B),
where the inequality follows directly from (9) and the last equality from (12).
If B = N then the inequality above becomes an equality by (8), which means
that x ∈ C(vH) holds true. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 Let v ∈ Γ (N). Then
M(v) =
⋃
H∈C
C(vH).
Proof It suffices to combine Theorem 1 with Lemma 5.
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4 Properties of Intermediate Set
In this section the intermediate set is compared with the core and the Weber
set. We list important properties and show whether they are satisfied for those
solution concepts. Further, we briefly discuss the relation of the intermediate
set to other set-valued solutions.
4.1 Comparison with the core and the Weber set
The properties of the intermediate set are summarized in Table 1. We follow
the approach presented in [15, Section 8.11], where numerous properties and
solution concepts are listed together with conditions under which a certain
property is satisfied by a given solution concept. For the reader’s convenience
we repeat the definitions and include the known properties of the core and the
Weber set.
Definition 3 Let ∅ 6= Ω ⊆ Γ (N). We say that a solution σ : Ω → 2R
n
satisfies
– nonemptiness (NE) if σ(v) 6= ∅ for every v ∈ Ω;
– convex–valuedness (CON) if σ(v) is convex for every v ∈ Ω;
– Pareto optimality (PO) if x(N) = v(N) for every v ∈ Ω and every x ∈ σ(v);
– individual rationality (IR) if xi ≥ v({i}) for every i ∈ N , every v ∈ Ω and
every x ∈ σ(v);
– superadditivity (SUPA) if σ(v1) + σ(v2) ⊆ σ(v1 + v2) for every v1, v2 ∈ Ω
such that v1 + v2 ∈ Ω;
– subadditivity (SUBA) if σ(v1) + σ(v2) ⊇ σ(v1 + v2) for every v1, v2 ∈ Ω
such that v1 + v2 ∈ Ω;
– additivity (ADD) if σ is both subadditive and superadditive;
– anonymity (AN) if π(σ(v)) = σ(πv) for every v ∈ Ω and π ∈ Πn such that
πv ∈ Ω, where π(σ(v)) = {(xπ(1), . . . , xπ(n)) | x ∈ σ(v)} and πv is defined
by πv(A) = v(π−1(A)), A ⊆ N ;
– equal treatment property (ETP) if xi = xj for every x ∈ σ(v), every v ∈ Ω
and any substitutes i, j ∈ N in v, that is, v(A∪{i}) = v(A∪{j}), for each
A ⊆ N \ {i, j};
– reasonableness (RE) if for every v ∈ Ω and for every x ∈ σ(v) we have
bmini (v) ≤ xi ≤ b
max
i (v) for all i ∈ N , where
bmini = min
A⊆N\{i}
(v(A ∪ {i})− v(A)),
bmaxi = max
A⊆N\{i}
(v(A ∪ {i})− v(A));
– covariant under strategic equivalence (COV) if for every v, w ∈ Ω, every
α > 0 and every additive game z such that w = αv + z, we have σ(w) =
ασ(v) + {(z({1}), . . . , z({n})};
– null player property (NP) if for every v ∈ Ω and every x ∈ σ(v), we have
xi = 0 whenever player i is a null player, that is, v(A ∪ {i}) = v(A) for all
A ⊆ N ;
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– dummy property (DUM) if for every v ∈ Ω and every x ∈ σ(v) we have
xi = v({i}) whenever player i is a dummy player, that is, v(A ∪ {i}) =
v(A) + v({i}) for all A ⊆ N \ {i}.
C(v) M(v) W(v)
Nonemptiness • X X
Convex–valuedness X X
Pareto optimality X X X
Individual rationality X • •
Superadditivity X
Subadditivity X X
Additivity
Anonymity X X X
Equal treatment property
Reasonableness X X X
Covariance X X X
Null player property X X X
Dummy property X X X
Table 1: Fulfillment of selected properties. The mark X means that the prop-
erty is satisfied on Ω = Γ (N), while • means that only a “significant” subclass
of games Ω ( Γ (N) has the corresponding property. The empty space indi-
cates that the property is not satisfied by every game.
Not all the proofs are presented here. We included only those which are
nontrivial, important or use the concepts of nonsmooth calculus. In all other
cases the reader is referred to an analogous comparison [15, Table 8.11.1]. Well-
known facts about the core are included in Table 1 for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 6 Both M and W satisfy NE.
Proof Since the limiting and the Clarke superdifferential of a Lipschitz func-
tion are nonempty by [17, Corollary 8.10, Theorem 9.13], bothM(v) andW(v)
are nonempty for any game v. ⊓⊔
It follows directly from the corresponding definitions that both C and W
satisfy CON. By contrast, the set M(v) need not be convex; see Example 1.
Since PO is satisfied by W , it is also satisfied by any smaller solution concept.
The next lemma states that property IR of both M and W characterizes
the so-called weakly superadditive (zero-monotonic) games, which are defined
as elements of
Γ ∗(N) = {v ∈ Γ (N) | v(A∪{i}) ≥ v(A)+v({i}) for all A ⊆ N and i ∈ N \A}.
Lemma 7 Let ∅ 6= Ω ⊆ Γ (N). Then the following three claims are equivalent:
1. Ω ⊆ Γ ∗(N);
2. M satisfies IR on Ω;
3. W satisfies IR on Ω.
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Proof Let v ∈ Ω ⊆ Γ ∗(N). Then for any marginal vector x and every i ∈ N ,
there exists A ⊆ N \ {i} such that
xi = v(A ∪ {i})− v(A) ≥ v({i}).
Since W(v) is the convex hull of all the marginal vectors, we have shown
that W satisfies IR on Ω. This implies that M satisfies IR on Ω as well.
Conversely, assume thatM satisfies IR on some family of games Ω ⊆ Γ (N).
By way of contradiction, let Ω 6⊆ Γ ∗(N). Then there exists v ∈ Ω, some A ⊆ N
and i ∈ N \A such that v(A∪{i})− v(A) < v({i}). But this means that there
is a marginal vector x satisfying
xi = v(A ∪ {i})− v(A) < v({i}).
Since every marginal vector lies in M(v), we have arrived at a contradiction
with IR of M on Ω, and the proof is finished. ⊓⊔
Concerning SUPA, SUBA and ADD, the proofs are consequences of the
general results about superdifferentials/subdifferentials.
Lemma 8 M andW are subadditive and none of them is additive, in general.
Proof It suffices to apply Proposition 4 from Appendix A to the Lova´sz exten-
sion of a game. ⊓⊔
Anonymity holds true for both M and W by Proposition 2 and Lemma 3,
since all the discussed superdifferentials have an analogous property. Since
ETP is in general violated by C, it cannot hold for any larger solution concept.
Similarly, property RE is true for W and thus for any solution σ included
in W .
Lemma 9 C, M and W satisfy COV.
Proof Let v, w ∈ Ω and α > 0 be such that w = αv+ z, where z is an additive
game. Since the mapping v ∈ Γ (N) 7→ vˆ is linear, we obtain
wˆ(x) = αvˆ(x) + zˆ(x), x ∈ Rn.
As z is an additive game, its Lova´sz extension zˆ is a linear function. The sought
result is then a consequence of Proposition 4 from Appendix A. ⊓⊔
As regards the null player property, it is easy to see that the Weber set
has NP. Hence, it follows from the inclusion (7) that the intermediate set has
NP as well. Since NP and COV imply DUM by [15, Remark 4.1.18], we have
completed the whole Table 1.
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4.2 Relation to other solution concepts
We will briefly comment on the relation between the intermediate set and
selected solution concepts for coalitional games. Our sample contains only the
solutions which bear a formal resemblance to the intermediate set or those
containing the core. We omit the discussion of the solution concepts whose
position with respect to the intermediate set is clear due to a known result,
such as the selectope, which is always at least as large as the Weber set [6].
For the sake of brevity we do not repeat definitions of the discussed solutions,
but refer to the literature instead.
Solutions for Coalition Structures A coalition structure in an n-person
game is a partition {B1, . . . , Bm} of the player set N . Each coalition struc-
ture of Aumann and Dreze [3] induces the core solution with respect to that
coalition structure. Since any coalitional chain H = {C1, . . . , Ck} generates
an ordered partition1 (C1, C2 \ C1, . . . , Ck \ Ck−1), one can ask if there is
any relation between the core of coalition structures and the intermediate
set. The closer look reveals fundamental differences, however. Namely the
payoff vectors x associated with games on coalition structures usually sat-
isfy Pareto optimality locally, that is, x(Bi) = v(Bi) for each block Bi of
the partition. This is certainly not the case of a payoff x ∈ MH(v) since
(8) means that the coalition Ci \Ci−1 allocates the worth v(Ci)− v(Ci−1)
among its members. Another point of dissimilarity is that the condition
x(A) ≥ v(A) with A ⊆ N applies across all the blocks of partition in the
core of a game with a coalition structure {B1, . . . , Bm}, while the condition
(9) is used only for the sub-coalitions B of each block Ci \ Ci−1.
Equal Split-Off Set (ESOS) This solution concept is based on ordered par-
titions and may attain non-convex values; see [4, Section 4.2]. It follows
from Example 1 that M(v) is not contained in the ESOS of v. Moreover,
the additive game from Example 4.2(iv) in [4] shows that ESOS is not
a part of M either.
Equal Division Core (EDC) The solution EDC is another non-convex so-
lution concept, which was introduced by Selten in [19] and consists of “effi-
cient payoff vectors for the grand coalition which cannot be improved upon
by the equal division allocation of any subcoalition”. Using Example 1 we
can show that the EDC of v does not contain and is not contained inM(v).
Indeed, the EDC of this game coincides with the set
{x ∈ I(v) | x1 ≥
1
2 or (x2 ≥
1
2 and x3 ≥
1
2 )}.
Core Cover (CC) This solution was studied by Tijs and Lipperts [23]. Ex-
ample 1 yields that CC of the glove game coincides with the core and thus
it is strictly smaller than the corresponding intermediate set. The converse
strict inclusion is rendered by [23, Example 1].
1 Observe that the converse statement is true as well: Any ordered partition with
nonempty blocks is associated with a unique coalitional chain.
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Reasonable Set (RS) See [24] for details. Since the intermediate set has the
property RE from Definition 3, it holds true thatM(v) is included in RS(v)
whenever v ∈ Γ ∗(N).
Dominance Core (DC) The solution DC is defined as the set of all undom-
inated imputations. If v ∈ Γ ∗(N) and DC(v) 6= ∅, then [4, Theorem 2.13]
yields C(v) = DC(v), which means that M(v) contains DC(v).
In summary, the only remarkable relations are rendered by the last two items:
for every game v ∈ Γ ∗(N), we have DC(v) ⊆M(v) ⊆ RS(v).
5 Examples
In this section we simplify the formula (10) from Theorem 1 for two families
of games.
5.1 Simple games
We will compute the intermediate set for the class of simple games. The result
will be compared with the formula for the core of simple games. A game
v ∈ Γ (N) is monotone if v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B ⊆ N and v is called
simple if it is monotone, v(A) ∈ {0, 1} for each A ⊆ N , and v(N) = 1. Every
simple game v over the player set N can be identified with the family V of
winning coalitions in v as follows:
V = {A ⊆ N | v(A) = 1}.
Conversely, any system of coalitions V such that N ∈ V , ∅ /∈ V and
A ⊆ B ⊆ N, A ∈ V ⇒ B ∈ V ,
gives rise to a simple game v by putting v(A) = 1 if A ∈ V and v(A) = 0,
otherwise. The family of minimal winning coalitions in v is
Vm = {E ∈ V | B ( E ⇒ B /∈ V , for every B ⊆ N}.
Based on the concept of minimal winning coalitions, we will prove that
M(v) is a union of faces of the standard (n − 1)-dimensional simplex, where
each face corresponds to one minimal winning coalition. For any nonempty
coalition E ⊆ N , we put
∆E :=

x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
xi = 0 if i ∈ N \E
xi ≥ 0 if i ∈ E
x(E) = 1

 .
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Theorem 3 If v ∈ Γ (N) is a simple game, then
C(v) =
⋂
E∈Vm
∆E , (15a)
M(v) =
⋃
E∈Vm
∆E . (15b)
Proof The formula for core on simple games (15a) can be derived easily; see [14,
Example X.4.6], for instance. If x ∈
⋃
E∈Vm ∆E , then there is some E ∈ V
m
such that x ∈ ∆E . Since E is a minimal winning coalition, it is straightforward
to show that the chain {E,N} and x satisfy relations (8)–(9), which implies
x ∈M(v).
Conversely, assume that x ∈ M(v). By Theorem 1 there is a chain H =
{C1, . . . , Ck} such that x ∈ MH(v). Let l be the smallest integer satisfying
v(Cl) = 1. Consider now any E ∈ Vm with E ⊆ Cl. From (9) with i = l we
see that x(E ∩ (Cl \ Cl−1)) ≥ 1, which gives x(E ∩ (Cl \ Cl−1)) = 1 by (8).
Since x(N) = 1, we have x(N \ (E ∩ (Cl \ Cl−1))) = 0. But since xi ≥ 0 for
all i ∈ N , this implies that x(N \ E) = 0, which finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
Assume now that a simple game v is zero-normalized, that is, v({i}) = 0
for every player i ∈ N . Then the formula (15b) further simplifies as
M(v) =
⋃
E∈Vm
{x ∈ I(v) | xi = 0 for every i ∈ N \ E} ,
where I(v) is the set of all imputations (1). Thus, we have M(v) ⊆ I(v) in
this case. Note that the last inclusion also follows from Lemma 7 by zero-
monotonicity of v. The following example shows that I(v) ( M(v) for a
particular simple game that is not zero-monotonic.
Example 4 Let n = 3 and
v(A) =
{
1 if A ⊇ {1} or A ⊇ {2, 3},
0 otherwise,
for each A ⊆ {1, 2, 3}.
It is easy to see that
C(v) = ∅,
I(v) = {(1, 0, 0)},
M(v) = {(1, 0, 0)} ∪ conv{(0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}.
Note that this example shows that M(v) need not be a connected set in
Rn. △
Remark 5 Formulas (15a)–(15b) are also interesting from the perspective of
variational analysis. On the one hand, the limiting superdifferential is a union
of the Fre´chet superdifferentials with respect to a suitable neighborhood (Defi-
nition 4). On the other hand, the previous theorem states that in a special case
the Fre´chet superdifferential can be written as an intersection of the limiting
superdifferentials. This is a relation which does not hold true in general. △
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5.2 Glove game
In the previous subsection we have managed to computeM(v) for the class of
simple games. In this subsection we will perform the same task for the glove
game, which belongs to the class of assignment games [21]. In the glove game,
there are n = p+ q players and each of them has a glove: either a left one or
a right one. When a subset of players forms a coalition, then their joint profit
is the number of glove pairs owned together. Specifically, assume that L is the
set of all players having the left glove and R is the set of all players having
the right glove. Then
v(A) = min{|A ∩ L|, |A ∩R|}.
We always assume that L = {1, . . . , p}, R = {p + 1, . . . , p + q} and p ≥ q,
without loss of generality.
The shape of core of glove game is known since it is just a special case of
an assignment game; see [21, Section 3.3]. Nevertheless, in order to compare
the two solution concepts, we will state the known formula for C(v).
Proposition 3 If p > q, then C(v) consists of a single point x whose coor-
dinates are: xl = 0 for all l ∈ L and xr = 1 for all r ∈ R. If p = q, then
C(v) = conv{χL, χR}.
We will provide a simple way of determining the solution of (8)–(9).
Lemma 10 Let (C1, . . . , Ck) be a chain. Given i = 1, . . . , k, let pi and qi be
the number of left and right gloves, respectively, owned by Ci. Set p0 = q0 := 0.
– If pi−1 = qi−1 and pi = qi, then the solution set of system (8)–(9) is
conv{χL∩(Ci\Ci−1), χR∩(Ci\Ci−1)}.
– If pi−1 > qi−1 and pi < qi, then system (8)–(9) does not have a feasible
solution.
– If pi−1 ≥ qi−1 and pi ≥ qi and at least one inequality is strict, then x is a
solution to system (8)–(9) if and only if xl = 0 for all l ∈ (Ci \ Ci−1) ∩ L
and xr = 1 for all r ∈ (Ci \ Ci−1) ∩R.
– If pi−1 < qi−1 and pi > qi, then system (8)–(9) does not have a feasible
solution.
– If pi−1 ≤ qi−1 and pi ≤ qi and at least one inequality is strict, then x is a
solution to system (8)–(9) if and only if xl = 1 for all l ∈ (Ci \ Ci−1) ∩ L
and xr = 0 for all r ∈ (Ci \ Ci−1) ∩R.
Proof For this proof, it is more advantageous to work with ordered partitions
than with chain, thus we define Bi := Ci \ Ci−1. For the first statement,
we realize that χL∩Bi and χR∩Bi solve system (8)–(9). Conversely, denote x
to be any solution of this system. Then we obtain x(Bi) = pi − pi−1 and
x({l, r}) ≥ 1 for all l ∈ L ∩ Bi and r ∈ R ∩ Bi. But summing all these terms
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results in x({l, r}) = 1, which further implies xl1 = xl2 for all l1, l2 ∈ L ∩ Bi
and xr1 = xr2 for all r1, r2 ∈ R ∩Bi. But this implies the first statement.
Concerning the remaining four statements, we will proof only two of them
since the proof of the last two assertions is completely analogous. Assume
first that pi−1 = qi−1 and pi > qi. Then obviously any x with xl = 0 for all
l ∈ Bi ∩L and xr = 1 for all r ∈ Bi ∩R satisfies system (8)–(9). Consider now
any solution of this system. From (8) we see that x(Bi) = qi − qi−1 and from
(9) we have x(Bi \ {l}) ≥ qi − qi−1, which together with the nonnegativity of
xl implies xl = 0 for all l ∈ Bi ∩ L. But this implies one part of the third
statement.
Assume that pi−1 > qi−1 and consider any solution x of (8)–(9). Then we
have
x(Bi) = min{pi, qi} −min{pi−1, qi−1} = min{pi, qi} − qi−1. (16)
Taking B = {r} for any r ∈ Bi ∩ R results in xr ≥ 1. Similarly, by taking
B = {l} for l ∈ Bi ∩ L we get xl ≥ 0. This results in
x(Bi) = x(Bi ∩ L) + x(Bi ∩R) ≥ 0 + (qi − qi−1) = qi − qi−1. (17)
Combining formulas (16) and (17) leads to
qi ≤ min{pi, qi}. (18)
If pi < qi, then formula (18) cannot be satisfied and thus, system (8)–(9)
does not have any feasible solutions. On the other hand, if pi ≥ qi, then from
(16) we see that x(Bi) = qi− qi−1, and (17) further implies that x(Bi∩L) = 0
and x(Bi ∩R) = qi − qi−1. But this means that xr = 1 for all r ∈ Bi ∩R and
one inclusion has been proved.
To finish the proof, we must show that for pi ≥ qi and for x with xl = 0
for all l ∈ Bi ∩ L and xr = 1 for all r ∈ Bi ∩ R, the payoff vector x solves
(8)–(9). Then
x(Bi) = qi − qi−1 = min{pi, qi} −min{pi−1, qi−1} = v(Ci)− v(Ci−1).
Consider any B ⊆ Ci \Ci−1 = Bi and assume that B contains a players with
left gloves and b players with right gloves. Then
x(B) = b ≥ min{a+ pi−1 − qi−1, b} = min{a+ pi−1, b+ qi−1} − qi−1
= min{a+ pi−1, b+ qi−1} −min{pi−1, qi−1}
= v(Ci−1 ∪B)− v(Ci−1),
which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
We will prove the main theorem of this section. It says that every x ∈M(v)
can be generated via Theorem 1 by choosing coalitions B1, . . . , Bq+1 such that:
(i) B1, . . . , Bq are 2-player coalitions containing a pair of players each of which
owns one right and one left glove, respectively, (ii) the coalition Bq+1 contains
only the players possessing left gloves or Bq+1 = ∅ if p = q, that is, Bq+1 ⊆ L.
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Theorem 4 Assume thast p ≥ q. Then x ∈ M(v) if and only if there exists
L˜ ⊆ L with |L˜| = q and a bijection ρ : L˜→ R such that the following conditions
are satisfied:
xl + xρ(l) = 1 for all l ∈ L˜, (19a)
1 ≥ xl ≥ 0 for all l ∈ L˜, (19b)
xl = 0 for all l ∈ L \ L˜. (19c)
Proof Let x satisfy (19a)–(19c). We can enumerate the elements of L˜ as
l1, . . . , lq and define the coalitions
B1 = {l1, ρ(l1)}, . . . , Bq = {lq, ρ(lq)}, Bq+1 = L \ L˜
and chain H = (C1, . . . , Cq+1) with Ci = B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bi for i = 1, . . . , q + 1.
Then it is easy to verify that x ∈ M(v) by Theorem 1 and using the chain
above.
For the proof of the second inclusion, denote by pi the number of left gloves
owned by players Ci and by qi the number of right gloves owned by the same
players. Put p0 = q0 := 0. To prove the statement, we will construct ρ by a
variant of finite induction. There are three possibilities: p1 = q1, p1 < q1 or
p1 > q1.
If p1 = q1, then define two sets L1 := C1 ∩ L and R1 := C1 ∩R. The first
part of Lemma 10 states that x is a solution to system (8)–(9) if and only if
there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that xl = λ for all l ∈ L1 and xr = 1 − λ for all
r ∈ R1. Since |L1| = |R1|, we can define a bijection ρ : L1 → R1. Now observe
that
xl + xρ(l) = λ+ (1− λ) = 1
for every l ∈ L1. Hence, (19a)–(19b) holds true for L1.
If p1 > q1, then we deduce from the second part of Lemma 10 that there are
two possibilities: either there exists i > 0 such that p1 > q1, . . . , pi−1 > qi−1
with pi = qi or p1 > q1, . . . , pk > qk. We will consider only the first possibility
and return to the second one at the end of the proof. Let L1 := Ci ∩ L and
R1 := Ci ∩ R. Due to the third part of Lemma 10 this implies that xl = 0
for all l ∈ L1 and xr = 1 for all r ∈ R1. But since pi − p0 = qi − q0, there
is a bijection ρ between L1 and R1 and, similarly as in the case p1 = q1, we
observe that xl + xρ(l) = 1 and xl ≥ 0 for all l ∈ L1.
The case of p1 < q1 can be handled in exactly the same way. Note that it
may not happen that p1 < q1, . . . , pk < qk because there are more left gloves
than right gloves.
Applying this procedure multiple times, we have managed to find an index i,
sets Lˆ and Rˆ and a bijection ρ : Lˆ→ Rˆ such that the following properties are
satisfied:
1. pi = qi and pi+1 > qi+1, . . . , pk > qk,
2. xl + xρ(l) = 1 and xl ≥ 0 for all l ∈ Lˆ,
3. Lˆ ∪ Rˆ = Ci and |Lˆ| = |Rˆ| = pi.
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From the third part of Lemma 10 we obtain then that xl = 0 for all l ∈ L \ Lˆ
and xr = 1 for all r ∈ R \ Rˆ. Find any L′ ⊆ L \ Lˆ such that |L′| = |R \ Rˆ|,
define L˜ := Lˆ ∪ L′ and extend bijection ρ : Lˆ → Rˆ to a bijection ρ : L˜ → R.
Then any such L˜ and ρ satisfy (19a)–(19c), which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
6 Conclusions
We have inserted a new non-convex solution concept, the intermediate set,
in-between the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. Our main tool
in this paper is Theorem 1, which transforms the analytical task of comput-
ing the limiting superdifferential into the equivalent problem of solution of
finitely many systems of linear inequalities. The achieved characterization by
coalitional chains makes it possible to interpret the payoff vectors in the in-
termediate set as marginal coalitional contributions satisfying the conditions
(8)–(9) or, equivalently, as core allocations with respect to a family of marginal
games (Theorem 2).
We will outline some ideas for the future research on this topic:
1. The family of all coalitional chains in the player set N is in one-to-one
correspondence with the set of all nonempty faces of the permutohedron of
order n; see [26]. An idea is to look at the relation between the algebraic
structure of the corresponding face lattice and the geometric composition of
the convex components MH(v) of the intermediate set M(v). Specifically,
what are the properties of the mapping sending a chain H to the convex
polytope MH(v) for a fixed game v?
2. The following question was already mentioned in Remark 5 using the lan-
guage of variational analysis: For which games v is the core of v an intersec-
tion of selected components of the intermediate set? Example 1, Example 3
and Theorem 3 suggest that non-trivial examples of such coalitional games
v are not difficult to find.
3. Many solution concepts (the core, the Shapley value etc.) can be axioma-
tized on various classes of games. Is there an axiomatization of the inter-
mediate set on some class of coalitional games?
4. The coincidence of the core with the Weber set is essential for the char-
acterization of extreme rays of the cone of supermodular games presented
in [22]. There can be a large gap between the core and the Weber set outside
the family of supermodular games. Our plan is to study the geometrical
properties of the intermediate set on larger classes of games including the
supermodular games, such as the cone of exact games or the cone of super-
additive games.
24 Luka´sˇ Adam, Toma´sˇ Kroupa
Appendix
A Superdifferentials
In this section we will define the selected concepts of variational (nonsmooth) analysis,
mainly various superdifferentials which generalize the superdifferential of concave functions.
Since these superdifferentials will be computed only for the Lova´sz extension, we will confine
to defining superdifferentials only for piecewise affine functions. Even though the computa-
tion of these objects may be rather a challenging task, see e.g. [1,9], the presented framework
allows for a significant simplification. For the general approach based on upper semicontin-
uous functions, we refer the reader to [17].
The standard monographs on variational analysis [13,16,17] follow the approach usual
in convex analysis by dealing with subdifferentials instead of superdifferentials. However,
most of the results can be easily transformed to the setting of superdifferentials, usually by
reversing inequalities only.
Definition 4 Let f : Rn → R be a piecewise affine function and x¯ ∈ Rn. We say that
x∗ ∈ Rn is a
– regular (Fre´chet) supergradient of f at x¯ if there exists neighborhood X of x¯ such that
for all x ∈ X we have
f(x)− f(x¯) ≤ 〈x∗,x− x¯〉;
– limiting (Mordukhovich) supergradient of f at x¯ if for every neighborhood X of x¯ there
exists x ∈ X such that x∗ is a Fre´chet supergradient of f at x;
– convexified (Clarke) supergradient of f at x¯ if
x∗ ∈ conv{y ∈ Rn| ∀ neighborhood X of x¯ ∃x ∈ X ∩D with y = ∇f(x)},
where
D := {x ∈ Rn| f is differentiable at x}.
The collection of all (regular, limiting, convexified) supergradients of f at x¯ is called (Fre´chet,
limiting, Clarke) superdifferential and it is denoted by ∂ˆf(x¯), ∂f(x¯) and ∂f(x¯), respectively.
Remark 6 The previous definition can be found e.g. in [17, Definition 8.3]. Note that in the
original definition term o(‖x−x¯‖) is added. Because we work with piecewise affine functions,
this term is superfluous. If f is concave, then all the above superdifferentials coincide with
the standard superdifferential for concave functions. △
It is possible to show that
∂ˆf(x¯) ⊆ ∂f(x¯) ⊆ ∂f(x¯), x¯ ∈ Rn,
where all the inequalities may be strict. According to [17, Theorem 8.49] we have the follow-
ing relation between the limiting and the Clarke superdifferential for every piecewise affine
function f :
∂f(x¯) = conv ∂f(x¯).
We will show the differences among the three discussed superdifferentials.
Example 5 Let f : R→ R be defined by
f(x) =


x if x ∈ (−∞, 0],
0 if x ∈ [0, 1],
x− 1 if x ∈ [1,∞).
This function is depicted in Figure 3. Consider points x¯ = 0 and y¯ = 1. The locally sup-
porting hyperplanes from the definition of Fre´chet superdifferential at x¯ are depicted in the
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x¯ y¯
Fig. 3: Supergradients for a piecewise affine function f
figure. Note that there are no affine majorants for f at y¯, which means that the Fre´chet
superdifferential is empty at this point. Thus we obtain
∂ˆf(x¯) = [0, 1], ∂ˆf(y¯) = ∅,
∂f(x¯) = [0, 1], ∂f(y¯) = {0, 1},
∂f(x¯) = [0, 1], ∂f(y¯) = [0, 1].
△
The superdifferential sum rule is employed frequently in this paper. The following propo-
sition collects the results of [17, Exercise 8.8, Corollary 10.9, Exercise 10.10].
Proposition 4 Let f1, f2 : Rn → R be piecewise affine functions. Then
∂(f1 + f2)(x) ⊆ ∂f1(x) + ∂f2(x), x ∈ R
n.
Moreover, if at least one of the functions is smooth around x, we obtain equality in the
previous relation.
B Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, consider first a game v ∈ Γ (N), fix x¯ ∈ Rn and choose any pi ∈ Π(x¯).
Then there are necessarily unique integers
0 = L0 < L1 < · · · < Lk = n
such that Li −Li−1 is the number of coordinates of x¯ which have the i–th greatest distinct
value in the order given by pi:
x¯pi(1) = · · · = x¯pi(L1) > x¯pi(L1+1) = · · · = x¯pi(L2) > · · · > x¯pi(Lk−1+1) = · · · = x¯pi(Lk).
Define
Ci := {pi(1), . . . , pi(Li)}
and observe that Ci is independent of the choice of pi ∈ Π(x¯). Take any x sufficiently close
to x¯ and select some ρ ∈ Π(x). Then ρ ∈ Π(x¯) and
V
ρ
j (x) ⊆ V
ρ
j (x¯), j = 1, . . . , n,
V
ρ
Li
(x) = V ρLi
(x¯) = Ci, i = 1, . . . , k.
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This allows us to write vˆ in a separable structure
vˆ(x) =
k∑
i=1
vˆi(xCi\Ci−1), (20)
where xA is the restriction of x to components A and vˆi : R
|Bi| → R is defined as
vˆi(y) =
|Bk|∑
j=1
yϕ(j)
[
v(Ci−1 ∪ V
ϕ
j (y)) − v(Ci−1 ∪ V
ϕ
j−1(y))
]
,
where ϕ ∈ Π(y). We now fix a constant c > 0, coalition B ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1 and denoting a to
be the common value of x¯ on Ci \ Ci−1, we obtain
vˆi((x¯ + cχB)Ci\Ci−1 ) = a [(v(Ci)− v(Ci−1 ∪ B)] + (a+ c) [(v(Ci−1 ∪B) − v(Ci−1)] ,
vˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1 ) = a [(v(Ci)− v(Ci−1)] ,
so that
vˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1 + cχB)− vˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1) = c [(v(Ci−1 ∪ B)− v(Ci−1)] . (21a)
When we choose B = N , we can move in the opposite direction as well, obtaining
vˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1 − cχN )− vˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1) = c [(v(Ci)− v(Ci−1)] . (21b)
Now we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 11 For any i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have
∂ˆvˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1 ) =
{
x∗
∣∣∣∣∣ x
∗(Ci \ Ci−1) = v(Ci) − v(Ci−1),
x∗(B) ≥ v(Ci−1 ∪B) − v(Ci−1) for all B ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1
}
.
Proof The definition of Fre´chet superdifferential and the piecewise affinity of vˆi give
∂ˆvˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1) = {x
∗| vˆi(y)−vˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1 ) ≤ 〈x
∗,y−x¯Ci\Ci−1 〉 for all y close to x¯Ci\Ci−1}.
Consider now any x∗ ∈ ∂ˆvˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1), any B ⊆ Ci \ Ci−1, and put y = x¯Ci\Ci−1 + cχB,
where c > 0 is sufficiently small. By realizing that 〈x∗,y − x¯Ci\Ci−1〉 = cx
∗(B) and from
relation (21a) it follows that
x∗(B) ≥ v(Ci−1 ∪ B)− v(Ci−1).
Similarly from (21b) we obtain equality in the previous relation for B = N . This finishes
the proof of the first inclusion.
Consider now any x∗ from the right–hand side of the formula in Lemma 11 and fix any y
from a sufficiently small neighborhood of x¯C\Ci−1 . Defining
y0 := x¯Ci\Ci−1 − χ{1,...,|Ci\Ci−1|},
yj := x¯Ci\Ci−1 + χ{ϕ(1)...ϕ(j)}, j = 1, . . . , |Ci \ Ci−1|,
we have
y ∈ conv
{
y0,y1, . . . ,y|Ci\Ci−1|
}
.
From the assumption and from (21) we obtain that
vˆi(y
j)− vˆi(x¯Ci\Ci−1 ) ≤ 〈x
∗,yj − x¯Ci\Ci−1〉 (22)
for all j = 0, . . . , |Ci \ Ci−1|. Since vˆi is linear on very particular domains and since y lies
in the convex hull of the above points, we obtain that formula (22) holds also for y. This
finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
The decomposition (20) together with Lemma 11 imply that Theorem 1 holds true.
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